These cipher suites do not preserve forward-secrecy and are not commonly used. Other TLS implementations (ex: Rustls) do not support or enable these suites by default. RFC 9325 [1] states that these suites should not be used. The IETF Draft "Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS" [2] mandates that these suites not be used.

Some TLS_RSA_* cipher suites are already disabled because they use DES, 3DES, RC4, or NULL, which are disabled. This action will disable all remaining TLS_RSA cipher suites.

[1] RFC 9325, Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325.html#section-4.1-2.5.1): "Implementations SHOULD NOT negotiate cipher suites based on RSA key transport, a.k.a. "static RSA". Rationale: These cipher suites, which have assigned values starting with the string "TLS_RSA_WITH_*", have several drawbacks, especially the fact that they do not support forward secrecy."
[2] IETF Draft, Deprecating Obsolete Key Exchange Methods in TLS (https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tls-deprecate-obsolete-kex-05.html#section-4): "Clients MUST NOT offer and servers MUST NOT select RSA cipher suites in TLS 1.2 connections. (Note that TLS 1.0 and 1.1 are deprecated by [RFC8996], and TLS 1.3 does not support static RSA [RFC8446].)"